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Abstract
The paper considers tacit collusion in markets which are not fully
transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some
probability before deciding which rm to purchase from, and each rm
only detects the other rms price with some probability. Increasing
transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while it increas-
ing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more di¢ cult.
Conditions are given under which increases in a common factor, a¤ect-
ing transparency positively on both sides, are pro-competitive. With
two standard information technologies, this is so, when rms are easier
to inform than consumers.
Keywords: Transparency, Tacit Collusion, Cartel Theory, Compe-
tition Policy, Internet. JEL: L13 ,L40
1 Introduction
The e¤ect of market transparency on competition is much debated, see for
instance OECD (2001). The EU Council nds that "The transparency of
energy prices contributes to the creation and smooth operation of the in-
ternal energy market" and Council Directive 90/377/EEC species a pro-
cedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, cs@econ.ku.dk,
www.econ.ku.dk/CSchultz
yI have benetted from discussions with Joe Harrington, Morten Hviid, Kai-Uwe Kühn,
and Thomas Rønde and with participants in the CIE 2008 conference, the IIO conference,
Boston 2009, and the CCP conference, Norwich, 2009.
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industrial end-users, see O¢ cial Journal (1990). While consumers previ-
ously had to exert considerable e¤ort to compare prices in many markets
such comparisons are now often avaliable with a click on the mouse. It
is often suggested that consumer or government agencies should counter
weak competition by setting up price comparison sites and thus improve
transparency on the consumer side of the market. For instance, the Dan-
ish National Consumer Agency (a government agency) hosts price com-
parison pages for banks, cellphones, natural gas, and home utilities (see
http://www.forbrug.dk/test/priser/). Evidently, such facilities may also be
used by rms. It is an interesting, and so far unresolved issue, whether an
increase in price transparency a¤ecting both sides of the market at the same
time is to be considered pro-competitive. This paper seeks to make some
headway on this issue.
Improved transparency on the producer side is mostly viewed as anti-
competitive since it is thought to facilitate tacit collusion, see for instance,
Stigler (1964), Green-Porter, (1984), Tirole (1988), Kühn and Vives (1995)
and Kühn (2001). Transparency on the consumer side is thought to have
opposite e¤ects. Here the arguments usually refer to a static setting, build-
ing on results of the search literature of the 80ies like Varian (1980), Stahl
(1989), Burdett and Judd (1983) and many others. An exeption is Schultz
(2005), where I show that in a di¤erentiated Hotelling market improved
transparency on the consumer side makes tacit collusion more di¢ cult, while
it has (almost) no e¤ect if the market is almost homogeneous. The present
paper investigates the e¤ects on tacit collusion from a change of a common
factor increasing transparency on both sides of the market. In the homo-
geneous market, the e¤ect is anti-competitive, since only the producer side
matters. In a di¤erentiated market, however, this is not so. In general, the
result depends on the relative elasticities of transparency wrt the common
factor on either side. However, for two of the most widely used information
technologies in the literature - a simple concave technology and the model
of Butters (1977) and Grossmann-Shapiro (1984) - the result is unambigous.
In a su¢ cently di¤erentiated market, if rms are easier to inform than con-
sumers, an increase in a common factor promoting transparency on both
sides is pro-competitive. Although perhaps surprising at rst sight, the rea-
son is intuitive: When rms are easier to inform, they are relatively well
2
informed. Hence, increases in price transparency a¤ects the more poorly
informed consumer side relatively more, and this is the crucial issue.
Hence, from a competition policy perspective the results of this paper
points to that in homogeneous markets, competition authorities (and con-
sumer agencies) should not try to further price transparency. Price trans-
parency only a¤ect competition through the producer side, and this e¤ect
is anti-competitive. In (su¢ ciently) di¤erentiated markets, the relation is
di¤erent. Here both producer and consumer side e¤ects are relevant and
they counter each other. Under standard assumptions on information pro-
liferation, the consumer side e¤ects dominate and measures which increase
transparency on both sides are likely to be pro-competitive.
We assume that a consumer learns prices with a given probability less
than one. Hence, only a fraction of consumers will be informed about prices
as in Varian (1980). We identify transparency on the consumer side with
the fraction of informed consumers. Similarly, on the producer side, rms
learn each othersprices with some probability only. Since market demand is
stochastic, this implies that in a collusive equilibrium, a rm only learns that
another rm has deviated with some probability. We study trigger strategy
equilibria where a punishment is only initiated if a rm learns that the other
rm has deviated. Firmscollusive strategies thus involve price-monotoring
schemes for the competitiors. These equilibria have the virtue that they are
simple and they accord well with the evidence from many cartel cases. It is
well known that implicit cartels may also rely punishment phases initiated
when demand conditions turned out to be su¢ ciently bleak, i.e where rms
employ sales monotoring schemes. While such startegies are intellectually
appealing, it appears that the more simple strategies considered here are in
fact used by many of the cartels we know of. Furthermore, diseminating
information about members pricing and sales has traditionally been core
business for established cartels, so that deviations from adhering to the
collusion cannot go undetected. Such behavior is consistent with trigger
strategies based on observed deviations from collusion.
Market transparency has been analyzed in various ways in the literature.
An early contribution is Varian (1980) who studies a homogeneous market
where some consumers are unaware of prices. In this setting the rmsex-
pected prices and prots decrease in the level of market transparency. The
3
search literature, see for instance Burdett and Judd (1993) or Stahl (1989)
develops this further: When search costs are lowered, search intensifes and
so does competition. A recent literature has taken op this lead, Ellisson and
Wolitzky (2008) extend Stahls work to include delibarate obfuscation by
the rms, so that consumers search costs increase. See also Wilson (2008).
In this literature rms strategically make consumer search costly. The vo-
luminous literature on advertising, see the survey in Bagwell (2007), also
discusses markets where some parties are uninformed about prices, but here
rms actively try to spread information on the consumer side. Anderson
and Renault (1999) extend search to include product characteristics as well
as prices and show that prices rise with search costs. Gabaix and Laibson
(2006) and Armstrong and Chen (2008) consider "inattentive consumers",
who are not aware of quality and price or quality and price of an add on.
While these contributions all adress di¤erent issues of transparency, they
are concerned with static outcomes, while my paper focusses on the ef-
fects on collusion from transparency. Secondly, while many of these papers
seek to endogenize transparency in various ways, I focus on the case, where
transparency is exogenous and potentially a¤ected by an agent or authority
outside the market such as a consumer agency.
Nilsson (1999) considers a homogeneous market with costly consumer
search a la Burdett and Judd (1993). He shows that lower search costs facil-
itate collusion, since the prots in the collusive and punishment phases are
a¤ected di¤erently by changes in search costs as consumers are induced to
search more in the punishment phase, which consists of innite repetition
of a mixed strategy Nash equilibirum. In Schultz (2005) as well as in the
present paper, the fraction of informed consumers does not di¤er in the col-
lusive and punishment phases. Herre and Rasch (2009) show that the e¤ect
of transparency on the consumer side on tacit collusion is not unambigious if
one relaxes the assumptions of the standard di¤erentiated Hotelling model.
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the
market. The one period equilibrium is characterized in Section 3. Section 4
introduces tacit collusion, and sections 5 and 6 treat high and low product
di¤erentiation respectively. Section 7 o¤ers some concluding comments.
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2 The market
We consider a Hotelling market with a continuum of consumers. Consumer x
is located at x 2 [0,1]. A consumer wishes to buy zero or s units of the good
where s is a stochastic variable distributed according to the cdf  (s) with
mean
R
sd (s) = 1: The variable s introduces stochastic demand in a simple
way into the model. We assume that [0; 1] is contained in the support of  ;
so that any decline in demand below the mean is possible. The two rms
are located at 0 and 1 respectively. A consumer buying s goods at the price
p from a rm she is located y away from receives utility (u  p0   ty) s: The
parameter t > 0 is the transportation cost, reecting the degree of product
di¤erentiation or "pickiness" of the consumers. All consumers are potential
costumers at each rm: u  t: If a consumer is informed about both rms
prices she is indi¤erent between buying from either rm if she is located at
x(p0; p1)  1
2
+
p1   p0
2t
: (1)
A fraction  of the consumers are informed about both rms prices,
while the rest are uninformed. An uninformed consumer cannot learn prices
by visiting both rms, she can only visit one rm in a period. The rmslo-
cations are known to all consumers. The variable  is our measure of market
transparency at the consumer side. Both information types of consumers
are uniformly distributed on locations. An uninformed consumer has an
expectation pei of rm i
0s price. If she is located y away from rm i; her
expected utility from buying one unit from i is u  pei   ty: She is indi¤erent
between buying from the two rms, if she is located at x(pe0; p
e
1).
In a period, the time line is as follows: First s realises and it is not
observed by rms. Then rms set prices, which are observed by some con-
sumers only, the rest form expectations. Consumers decide on which rm to
go to - if any. If an uninformed consumer arrives at a rm and nds that the
price is higher than expected, she may decline to buy. Finally, transactions
take place.
We will assume that the fraction of informed consumers is su¢ ciently
high such that
t
u
<
2
2 + 
; (2)
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this will imply that the market is covered in a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
We will focus on symmetric equilibria where pe0 = p
e
1 = p
e. As will
become clear, the equilibrium price will be so low (at most u  t=2) that all
consumers buy and each rm faces (1  ) =2 uninformed consumers. The
number of consumers visiting rm 0 can therefore be written without explict
reference to the expected prices as
D(p0; p1; ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
+ 1 2 if p0 < p1   t

 
1
2 +
p1 p0
2t

+ 1 2 if p1   t  p0  p1 + t
1 
2 if p1 + t  p0  u  t2
1 
2
 u p0
t

if p1 = u  t2  p0  u:
(3)
Firm 00s demand equals the number of visiting consumers times s; D(p0; p1; )s:
As the mean of s equals one, the expected demand equalsD (p 0; p1; ) :Mar-
ginal costs are constant and we normalize them to zero, so rm 00s prot in
a period is p0D(p0; p1)s and the expected prot 0 equals p0D(p0; p1):
Under (2) the monopoly price, pm; is given as pm = u  t=2:
3 One period equilibrium
The one period Nash equilibrium may be in pure or mixed strategies de-
pending on the degree of product di¤erentiation relative to the maximal
willingness to pay, t=u; and the transparency of the market, . We rst
consider the case where the equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Each rm chooses the price to maximize the expected prot taking as
given the other rms price. In a symmetric equilibrium, the rms set the
same price, serve both informed and uninformed consumers, and the relevant
part of the demand function is given by the second line in (3). The Nash
equilibrium price, pN ; and expected prot, N ; are
pN =
t

; N =
t
2
: (4)
An increase in consumer transparency, ; increases competition and lowers
the Nash-equilibrium price and prot. When rms choose prices, they take
into account that a price decrease is only noticed by the informed consumers.
An increase in consumer transparency makes demand more elastic and com-
petition more intense. In the one shot game the rms therefore - jointly  
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have no interest in promoting consumer transparency. It is straightforward
to check that the second order condition for maximum is fullled.1
When the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies, then
  p
m   pN
pN
is a measure of the relative gains to rms from monpoly pricing relative to
competitive pricing. Evidently, the gain is a function of u; t and : We can
rewrite condition (2) as
 > 0: (2)
When goods are close substitutes, pN = t= becomes very low and will
not be an equilibrium price since it becomes a better option for a rm to raise
its price to the monopoly price pm = u  t=2 and only sell to the (1  ) =2
uninformed consumers who visit the rm2: This gives higher prot than pN
if the degree of product di¤erentiation is so low that
t
u
<
2 (1  )
(1 + ) (2  ) ,  >

1  : (5)
When (5) is fullled, product di¤erentiation is so low that a pure strategy
equilibrium does not exist. Varian (1980) shows that in a homogeneous
market where a fraction  of the consumers are uninformed, there are no
pure strategy Nash equilibria, but a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
exists. The same happens in the Hotelling model, when the goods become
close substitutes. Schultz (2005) characterizes the symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium. The characterization does not allow closed form solutions, but
it is shown (in Lemma 1) that as the transport cost t tends to zero; the
limiting expected prot of each rm is3
lim
t!0
N =
1  
2
u: (6)
1 In deriving the equilibrium we assumed that the market is covered and the second
line of (3) is relevant, hence it should not be advantageous to undercut the other rm by
t and gain the whole informed market. This takes that

t

  t
  
+ 1 
2

< t
2
; which is
fullled for all positive  and t: Under assumption (2) the market is covered in the Nash
equilibrium.
2 If the rm decides to sell only to a fraction of the uninformed consumers arriving, the
best price solves maxp0 (1  ) u p0t p0 , if it decides to sell to all, p0 = u  t2 : For small t;
the best choice is p0 = u  t2
3Since no confusion should be possible, we abuse notation slightly by using N to
indicate the expected prot in the pure as well as in the mixed strategy equilibrium.
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The result is intuitive: It is always an option for a rm to charge the
reservation price, which equals u when transportation costs vanish, and only
serve the uninformed consumers arriving. In a mixed strategy equilibrium,
each price in the support of the distribution must give same expected prot,
and hence the expected prot is given by (6). When goods are almost
homogeneous, the market works as if rms extract almost all possible rent
from the uninformed consumers and none from the informed. A similar
result was obtained by Varian for the homogeneous market. In Schultz
(2005) it is also shown that
lim
t!0
@N
@
=  u
2
: (7)
4 Tacit Collusion
Now we consider the repeated game. There are innitely many periods,
 = 0; :::;1: In each period the market is as described above. The size
of the market s di¤ers over periods, we assume that s is drawn from the
distribution  independently over the periods. Firms seek to maximize the
discounted sum of expected prots and both have the discount factor ;
which fullls 0 <  < 1: We will assume that a consumers information type
(as well as her location) is the same in all periods.
So far we have concentrated on market transparency on the consumer
side. Whether rms can observe each othersprices ex post is not important
for the one period analysis but it is for the dynamic analysis. We will identify
transparency on the producer side with the probability that a rm observes
the other rms price. Let this probability be ; where 0 <   1: We will
assume that if a rm observes the other rms price, then it is common
knowledge. It may, for instance, be the case that the price is put on an
internet side run by an independent consumer agency known to both rms,
news papers may cite the price, or they are both aware that a person has
disclosed the information. It may also be the case that the rms deliberately
have made an arrangement for sharing of information as many cartels have
in fact done.
The fact that rms may not observe each others price can a¤ect the
possibility of maintaining tacit collusion. If rms collude on a high price, a
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rm may deviate in a period to a lower price and the other rm may not
see it, but its sales will be a¤ected. However, since the market demand
is stochastic this lowering in sales may also be due to slack demand. We
will focus on trigger strategy equilibria where punishment phases are only
initiated when rms observe a deviation. Here transparency on the producer
side will have a direct e¤ect.
As is well known, Green and Porter (1984) show that even though rms
do not observe each others strategic variables, they may nevertheless col-
lude relying on punishment phases which are initiated after periods of very
slack demand. One could of course also conceive of such equilibria in our
model, but we will not consider this extension here. The strategies we con-
sider here have the virtue that they are simple: "I punish you if I catch
you cheating". There are many examples of cartels, where the punishment
strategies have relied on punishing deviations when the deviator is caught
in the act. An European example is provided by the Wood pulp case,
where 34 rms were ned by the European Commission for collusion. In its
decision (O¢ cial Journal, 1985) the Commission describes in detail how the
parties coordinated and monitored prices. The commission found evidence
that the explicit threats of punishments were made. It cites a document
summarizing a meeting between a number of the rms: The Finns will re-
spect the Spanish dominance in Spain if ENCE really increase their prices in
other countries: If Fincell learn about prices below US $ 360 also in the fu-
ture, they will reconsider their policy as to sales in Spain!4 This is exactly
the kind of strategy the rms are assumed to play in this paper. Another
example is provided by the celebrated Lysine cartel. The cartel divided the
market and had an elaborate punishment scheme in place: If a rm had
sold more than its allocated share of the market at the end of the calendar
year it would compensate the rms that were under budget by purchasing
that quantity of lysine from them (see Connor 2001 and Hammond 2005).
Clearly, such a punishment required detection of the individual sales, and
the members of the cartel mistrusted each other on this point, see Connor
(2001, p 12). Although the Lycine cartel rested on sales - not price - mono-
toring, the general principle is the same as in our model. A deviator caught
in the act is punished.
4O¢ cial Journal (1985) §60
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We focus on a trigger-strategy equilibrium, where in the collusive phase,
rms collude on the best possible price, either the monopoly price, pm =
u t=2 or some lower price. Observed deviations from collusion are punished
with reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium for the rest of the game as
suggested by Friedman (1971). Collusion on the price p can be sustained
if the present value of collusive prots exceeds the expected prot from a
deviation plus the present value of the expected continuation prot after a
deviation. With probability  the deviation is observed and the continuation
prot equals the present value of receiving Nash prots in all future. With
probability 1   the deviation is not observed and the continuation prots
equal the present value of expected collusive prots. Letting N denote
the expected prots of the Nash equilibrium (whether in mixed or pure
strategies) the non-deviation constraint therefore becomes
1
1  (p)  
d(p) + 

1  
N + (1  ) 
1  (p): (8)
When rms collude on p; their expected prot is (p) = p=2 in all periods.
If a rm deviates to a lower price, only informed consumers learn this before
they visit the rm. The uninformed expect the rm to set p and half of
them will visit the rm and get a nice surprise. The other half go to the
other rm and will not observe the deviation. The optimal deviation price
is
pd =
8<: 12

p+ t

if p  2t+ t
p  t if p > 2t+ t :
(9)
The rst expression in (9) applies when the optimal deviation does not
capture the whole market. The deviation prot is
d(p) =
(
1
8
(p+t)2
t if p  2t+ t
(p  t) 1+2 if p > 2t+ t :
(10)
Both expressions are increasing in  when p > t=: Hence, more can poten-
tially be gained from a deviation when the market is more transparent on
the consumer side.
If
  2; (11)
then d (pm) is given by the rst expression in (10) otherwise it is given by
the second.
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5 Di¤erentiated markets
We now consider the case where product di¤erentiation is relatively high
so that (5) is not fullled and the one shot Nash equilibrium is in pure
strategies.
Inserting the relevant expressions, we nd that the non-deviation con-
straint for full collusion on the monopoly price (8) is fullled when rms are
su¢ ciently patient, namely when
  ^ 
(

+4 if   2
 
(1+=)  if  > 2:
(12)
Clearly, 0 < ^ < 1: The rst expression in (12) applies when the optimal
deviation does not capture the whole market. Straightforward di¤erentia-
tion gives that ^ is increasing in the level of market transparency at the
consumer side, ; (since  depends positively on ) and decreasing in the
level of market transparency on the producer side, ; regardless of whether
 7 2. More consumer transparency makes collusion more di¢ cult, while
more producer transparency makes it easier. Increasing transparency on
the consumer side has two e¤ects, a deviation becomes more protable, but
the ensuing punishment becomes harder as well. On balance, the rst ef-
fect is the larger and therefore collusion becomes more di¢ cult. Increasing
transparency on the producer side makes it more likely that a deviation is
detected, and this makes a deviation less protable, thus collusion becomes
eaiser.
The condition,   2; is fullled for all  if u=t < 5=2 and fullled for
  1= (u=t  5=2) : In both cases, the extra prot from a large reduction in
price is su¢ ciently small, that the optimal deviation does not capture the
whole market. As is clear the condition is fullled for all  if the transporta-
tion cost, t; reecting the degree of product di¤erentiation or "pickiness" of
the consumers is su¢ ciently large.
Suppose then that the discount factor is lower than the crucial discount
factor, ^: In this case, it is not possible for the rms to sustain full collusion
on the monopoly price and the most favorable equilibrium from the point
of view of the rms involves a collusive price which exactly makes the non-
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deviation constraint (8) fullled. This gives
pc =
8<:

1 + 4 1 

pN if   2+
1 + (1 )
2
 (+)

pN if  > 2+ :
(13)
Clearly, pc (and the associated prot) is decreasing in transparency on the
consumer side and increasing in transparency on the producer side. Again
the rst line relates to the case where the optimal deviation does not capture
the whole market.
Summing up these results we have
Proposition 1 Suppose product di¤erentiation is high, so (5) is not ful-
lled. The lowest discount factor compatible with full collusion on the monopoly
price is given by (12). It increases in consumer side transparency and de-
creases in producer side transparency. If the discount factor is so low that
full collusion is impossible, then the highest price the rms are able to col-
lude on is given by (13). It decreases in consumer side transparency and
increases in producer side transparency.
Proposition 1 considers changes in transparency on one side as inde-
pendent of changes in the other side. But it may well be that measures
inuencing one side also inuence the other side. Price comparison sites
aimed at consumers may also be visited by producers and a¤ect the trans-
parency on the producer side as well. Similarly, news in the press may
inform both sides. Suppose, therefore, that there are some common factor
which inuences both the fraction of informed consumers and the likelihood
that a rm observes the other rms price. Let  2 R reect the common
factor. We will associate an increase in  with an increase in transparency
so that the fraction of informed consumers  =  () and 0 () > 0 and
the likelihood that a rm observes the other rms price  =  () ; and
0 () > 0: Transparency on the two sides of the market a¤ect the possib-
lities to collude di¤erently and the net e¤ect on collusion may be positive
or negative. Increasing  a¤ects the lowest discount factor compatible with
full collusion with
db
d
=
@b
@
@
@
+
@b
@
@
@
:
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Let e.g. e;  @()@ 
.
 () be the elasticity of  wrt : Then
db
d
> 0, e;
e;
<
(
1 + 1= if   2
22 4+32
2( ) if  > 2:
(14)
The decisive feature is the elasticities and not the levels of transparency
on the two sides. An increase in the common factor  is pro-competitive
if the elasticity of  wrt  is su¢ ciently large relative to the elasticity of 
wrt : The crucial cut o¤ value depends on the gains from collusion and the
transparency on the consumer side. When   2; so the optimal deviation
does not capture the whole market (cf, (11)), it is a su¢ cient condition for
fullling the the condition that the consumer side elasticity is larger than
the producer side elasticity.
If full collusion on the monopoly price cannot be sustained, then e¤ect
on the best collusive price, pc; from an increase in the common factor  is
dpc
d
=
@pc
@
@
@
+
@pc
@
@
@
;
so
dpc
d
< 0, e;
e;
<
(
1 + 1 4 if   2+
1 
 +

1 
2
2
+    2  if  > 2+ :
(15)
Again, an increase in the common factor is pro-competive if the consumer
side elasticity is su¢ ciently higher than producer side elasticity.
Proposition 2 Suppose product di¤erentiation is high, so (5) is not ful-
lled. An increase in a common factor  increasing transparency on both
sides of the market, increases the lowest discount factor compatible with full
collusion if  is su¢ ciently more elastic than  wrt ; so that (14) is ful-
lled. If the discount factor is so low that full collusion is impossible, then
an increase in  lowers the collusive price if  is su¢ cently more elastic
than  wrt , so that (15) is fullled
When a common factor a¤ects transparency on both sides, the compet-
itive e¤ect hinges on on which side of the market information spreads more
easily, as measured by the relevant elasticities. Evidently, this depends on
how information spreads - i.e. on the information technology. Suppose
13
a consumer agency spends resources informing market participants about
prices. We will now consider how this a¤ects the market under two simple
well known information technologies.
Suppose for example that the amount of money spent by some agency
informing market participants constitutes the common factor . The agency
could be a government agency, a consumer agency or some other organization
or entity. Suppose further that the probability the rms are informed about
prices is increasing in the amounts spent and given by the concave function5
 () =
0 + 
0 + + h
; (16)
where h > 0 represents the costliness of increasing the chance the rms
learn the prices, and 0 reect that even if the consumer agency spends no
resources, there will be some chance the rms learn each othersprices. If
rms are easily informed, h is low, while the opposite is the case if h is high.
The elasticity of  wrt  then becomes :
e; =
h
(0 + ) (0 + + h)
:
Suppose, similarly that the probability a consumer is informed is given
by the same kind of technology, but the costliness, f > 0; of informing a
consumer may be di¤erent. The fraction of informed consumers is then
 () =
0 + 
0 + + f
; and e; =
f
(0 + ) (0 + + f)
:
Hence,
e;
e;
=
h
f
0 + + f
0 + + h
< 1:
i¤ f > h; i.e. if rms are less costly to inform. Suppose   2; (which is
fullled if
 
u
t   52

 < 1) so that an optimal deviation captures the whole
market. From (14) and (15) we then have that more resources spent by the
consumer agency on information for sure is pro-competitive if f > h. If
  2; then relative elasticity has to be less than a cut o¤ value below one,
and f has to be su¢ ciently much larger than h:
As an other example, consider Grossman and Shapiros (1984) informa-
tion technology (based on Butter (1977)). Here ads are placed in magazines.
5This function is for instance used in Coate (2004)
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A given magazines readership is the fraction r of the population. This
equals the probabilty a consumer reads a given magazine. Furthermore, it
is assumed that the probability that a given consumer sees an ad in one
magazine is independent of the probability that she sees an ad in another
magazine; that is, di¤erent magazines have independent readerships. Then
if the agency places ads in  magazines, the probability that a given con-
sumer will see none of these ads is (1  r). To avoid the special case, where
the probability a consumer is informed is zero in the absence of the agency,
we assume that there will be one magazine informing about prices even if
the agency does not. To simplify, assume this magazine is not used by the
agency. Hence the probability a consumer does not learn about prices is
(1  r)+1: Conversely, the probability she does learn about prices is there-
fore
 () = 1  (1  r)+1: (17)
The elasticity of  wrt  is then
e; =  (ln (1  r)) (1  r)
+1
(1  r)+1   1 : (18)
Di¤erentiating, we nd
@e;
@r
=

(1  r)

(1  r)+1   1
2 1  (1  r)+1 + ln (1  r)+1 (1  r)+1 :
As 0 < r < 1; this is negative if
ln (1  r)a+1 <  

1  (1  r)+1

;
which is indeed true as ln 1 = 0; ln 0 (1) = 1; and ln 00 (x) < 0. Hence e; is
decreasing in r:
Suppose that the probability a rm reads a given magazine is z: Then the
probability that the rm is informed is  () = 1 (1 z)+1 and e; is given
by (18) with r replaced by z: If rms spend more resources than a consumer
on collecting information, i.e. are more likely to read a given magazine than
a consumer, then z > r; and since the elasticities are decreasing in r and z;
we have
e; > e;:
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Hence, if rms spend more ressources than consumers in achieving infor-
mation, so that z > r, they are more likely to be informed and provided
  2 then (14) and (15) are fullled and an increased e¤ort by the con-
sumer agency is pro-competitive. Again if   2; z has to be su¢ ciently
much larger than r; for this to be the case.
Hence, for both considered information technologies, if rms are easier
to inform and therefore better informed than consumers about prices (in the
probabilistic sense), a larger e¤ort by the agency informing the market is for
sure pro-competitive if the market is su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (such that the
rst lines in (14) and (15) are relevant). If the market is less di¤erentiated,
then the condition for this pro-competitive outcome is more stringent, then
rms have to be su¢ ciently much more informed.
Summing up :
Proposition 3 Suppose product di¤erentiation is high, so (5) is not ful-
lled. Consider an increase in a common factor  a¤ecting transparency
on both sides of the market, and   2. If the information techonogy is
given by (16) or by (17) then a marginal increase in  is pro-competitive
(both in terms of lowering the crucial discount factor for full collusion, and
in lowering the best price rms can collude on if full collusion is impossible)
if it is easier to inform rms, i.e. f < h or r < z: If  < 2 the same is
true if f ( r) is su¢ ciently smaller than h (z):
These results may appear counter-intuitive at rst: If rms are more
easy to inform, one could imagine that an increase in information is anti-
competitive as transparency will be higher on the producer side. The crucial
feature, however, is that the elasticities matter. If rms are easier to inform,
they are better informed from the outset and an increase in information will
have relatively less impact on the producer side of the market.
6 Almost homogeneous markets
Schultz (2005) showed that in the almost homogeneous market changes in
transparency on the consumer side do not a¤ect the scope for tacit collusion.
Changes in price transparency therefore only a¤ects competition through
the producer side and since this e¤ect is anti-competitive, the total e¤ect
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is anti-competitive. For the sake of completeness, we derive the relevant
crucial discunt factor here, when producer side transparency is included in
the model. When product di¤erentiation is very low (5) is fullled, the
Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and the optimal deviation price is
given by the second part of the expression (9). The lowest discount factor
compatible with full collusion is (using (8))
 =
pm   (1 + ) t
pm ( + )  2EN   (1 + ) t : (19)
Clearly, @=@ < 0; so an increase in  makes collusion easier if indeed it is
feasible. The e¤ect of an increase in  is
@
@
=


(pm   t)  pm   2EN+ ((pm   t)  t) 2@EN@ 
((1 + ) t  (+ ) pm + 2EN )2 :
Unfortunately, the sign of @

@ cannot directly be assessed for all relevant t
as we have no closed form solution for EN : In the limit, as t! 0; we get,
using (6) and (7),
lim
t!0
 =
1
1 + 
and lim
t!0
@
@
= 0 (20)
When product di¤erentiation is very low, the crucial discount factor allowing
collusion on the monopoly price is independent of ; the transparency of the
consumer side. The reason is that in such a market, a rm which deviates
by undercutting the other rm wil capture the whole informed part of the
market, and earn the monopoly prot from this part of the market. The
punishment (which is initiated with probability ) consists of loosing the
rms half share in monopoly prot from the informed part (as can be seen
from (6)). Transparency on the consumer side, ; changes the size of the
informed market, but not the relation between the whole or the half of this
part. Therefore  has no e¤ect on the no-deviation constraint. An increase
in producer transparency, ; still facilitates collusion, since this increases the
chance that the rm is punished for a deviation. Evidently, this implies that
if a common factor a¤ects transparency on both sides of the market, then
the e¤ect is unambigously anti-competitive.
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7 Concluding remarks
Homogeneous and di¤erentiated markets di¤er with respect to how one
shoud assess the virtues of measures promoting price transparency that may
a¤ect both sides of the market. We have shown that in a homogeneous mar-
ket, only the producer side e¤ect matters and this e¤ect is anti-competitive.
In such markets, competition agencies or consumer agencies should not pro-
mote price transparency. In di¤erentiated markets, however, the issue is
more complicated. In the simple di¤erentiated Hotelling market, the e¤ects
steming from the two sides counter each other. Under standard assumptions
about information proliferation, the consumer side e¤ect dominates and in
such markets measures promoting price transparency are pro-competitive.
The positive e¤ects of the consumer side dominate over the negative e¤ects
of the producer side. Evidently, the better the measures can be targeted
to the consumer side the better it is from a competition perspective. This
may be hard, though. The results of this paper is somewhat relieving in this
respect.
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